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l. The Court erred in overruling defendants• general 
demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause of action-------J 
2. The Court erred in overruling defendants' general 
demurrer to plaintiffs' second cause of action------1 
3. The Court erred in rendering judgment for plaintiffs 
on the first cause as amended when the same 
does not state facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action----------------------------------1 
4. There is a variance between the pleadings and the 
proof in first cause of action----------------------1 
5. There is a variance between the pleadings and the 
proof in second cause of action----------------------
6. That the conclusion (b) of first cause of action is 
not supported by the findings of the pleadings-------
7. That the Court erred in trying to maintain ju:r:isdiction 
of second cause of action, after rendering a de-
cision thereon, until after first cause of action 
should be determined in the Supreme Court------------
8. The Court erred in making one of the issues in dispute 
at the beginning of the_ trial the valid delivery 
of the deed-----------------------------------------
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In the Supreme Court or the State or Utah 
GENEVE GRAEHL BURT, LOR-
ELE BURT NEFF, KARLEE.N 
BURT, BONNIE. A. BURT, 
SHANNA G. BURT, JOHN G. 
BURT. 
Plaintiffs a;nd Respondents. 
vs. 
LUELLA H. BURT, Administra-
trix of the estate of John A. 
Burt, deceased; LUELLA H. 
BURT, an individual; EMER-
SON H. BURT, MRS·. HELEN 
B. REED, MRS. D·OROTHY B. 
FLOWERS, LEST'E,R C. BURT, 
MILTON F. BURT, 
Defendants and Appellamts. 
FAC·TS. 
No. 7313 
The brief heretofore filed by ap~p,ellants contains 
a short statement of facts, the text of the complaint 
and answer, set out in full .as originally filed, together 
with the pre-trial statement. The facts. of the cas.e are 
therein subs.tantia.lly set forth so that more in that re-
. g.ard is thought unnecessary except as comment upon 
the fa.cts is required during the argument that follows·. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I N D E: X----(Continued) 
Page 
Ryan v. Beaver County 21 Pac. (2nd) 858, 82 Utah 27 ____________ 4 
Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti 9 Cal. 2nd 95, 69 P. 2nd 845__________ 7 
Santa Monica Ice Cold Storage Co. v. Rossier et al, 109 
P. 2nd 382 .. _ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______ 13 
Ti·ghe v. D:avi:s (Mich.) 278 N. W. 60 ____________________________________________ 15 
Werner v. Werner (Kan.) 53 P. 127 .. ------------------------------------------ 7 
1 OLI.-1 Ll.-'7 TT (;. A_ 1.943 .............. ~-------------------·--··---- ··-------------------------- 5 
. . 




at the beginning of the trial the delivery of the 
deed for a special purpose only and without the nee-, 
cessary intent to vest title in grantee-------------1 
I 
Court erred in permitting Geneve Graehl Burt over 
the objection of defendants to testify what was 
in her own mind as is shown in the following 1 
testimony found on pp. 106 and 107 of transcript---1 
Court erred when it failed to follow its ruling----1 
Court erred in failing to make findings, .conclu- j 
sions and judgment as to whether or not the 
plaintiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the 
statute of limitations as presented in the issues 
by the last bhree.unnumbered paragraphs of de-
fendants' affirmative defense to the first cause 
of ~ction------------------------~-------------------
13. That the Court erred in failing to make findings, conclu-
sions and judgment as to whether or not the plaintiff 
are guilty of laches and barred by the statute of 
limitations as presented in the issues in paragraph 
7 of defendants• answer to plaintiffs' second cause 
of action-------------------------------------------· 
14. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the 
first cause of action are contrary to law-----------· 
15. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the 
second cause of action are contrary to law----------· 
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Appellants here were defendants and respondents 
were plaintiffs in the trial court. Both titles have been 
used in referring to the parties with the thought that 
doing so makes the reading of this. brief easier. 
Geneve Graehl Burt is the real party plaintiff be-
cause the other plaintiffs are her children and join to 
show that they .agree with the position taken by their 
mother in this action, but .seek no relief on their own 
behalf. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants set out fifteen separate assignments of 
error to justify their app-eal in this cas.e. 
The first is that the trial court erred in overruling 
the demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Respondents' 
answer to that contention is that there was no error and 
that even though the ruling had been erroneous still 
it was n<?'t prejudicial and so not reversible. Unless there 
is a basis upon which injury or prejudice may be pre-
sumed the error, if any, must be overlooked and is not 
reversible. Ryan v. Beaver County 21 Pac. (2nd) 858, 
82 Utah 27; Olsen v. H. D. Kress Co. Inc. 48 P'. 2nd 430, 
87 Utah 51. Counsel for defendants submitted his de-
murrer without argument and informed counsel for 
plaintiffs that as he wa.s filing an answer at the same 
time, he would not resist overruling of his demurrer. 
He accordingly asserted no particular objection to the 
complaint and expre,S:sed no view or interpretation of it 
which caused him surprise or resulted in prejudice, 
during the course of said trial. 
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'~The court must in every s.tage of an ac-
tion disregard any error or defect in the plead-
ings or proceedings, which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties, and no judg-
ment shall be reversed or affected by reason of 
such error or defect." Section 104-14~7 U.C.A. 
1943. 
''Tith respect to this rule, this court has said: 
''The burden, of course, is on the app~ella.nt 
to show, not only error, but prejudicial effect as 
,,~ell." J en~en v. Utah Railway Co. 270 Pac. 349 
p. 3G~~ 7~ Utah 366 p. 400. 
Furthermore, as shown by the p~re-trial statement 
set out on pages 13-16 of Appellants' Brief, the court 
held a pre-trial conference in said caus.e on December 
3, 1948 at which time the issues were fully discussed, 
and the scope of the trial determined. Counsel for p~lain­
tiffs at the outset of said pre-trial conference informed 
the court and counsel that if counsel for defendants 
intended to assert that the complaint alleged a legal. 
delivery of the deed by Geneve Graehl Burt to J-ohn 
A. Burt, deceased, .and that su·ch a p~leading was. in 
effect an admission of delivery in the legal s,ense with 
intent to vest title in the said John A. Burt then counsel 
for said plaintiffs would ask leave· to amend and so 
remove grounds for such a view of the complaint. Be-
cause of that statement and others which followed, the 
court indicated that whether there was a delivery in 
the legal sense would be made one of the issues of the 
trial. 
The trial proceeded accordingly and plaintiff was 
permitted to make the amendments to the complaint 
which had been mentioned and discussed at the pre-trial 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
conference. It seems cle,ar that the general rule respect-
ing the effect of amendments after a ruling on a de-
murrer applies : 
'':Any error in the ruling on a demurrer to 
a complaint becomes immaterial if the complaint 
is amended and the issues made on the amended 
pleading are tried and judgment rendered there-
on.'' Bancroft Code Practice Vol. 9, p. 97 43 sec. 
7410. 
At the commencement of the trial appellants were 
already advised and aware of respondents' theory of 
the case. They proceeded to trial without objection as 
to the issues ; they did not contest the scope. of the trial 
as outlined by the pre-trial statement and cannot now 
be permitted to say that they were prejudiced by an 
alleged error in overruling the demurrer to the first 
cause of action in the complaint. 
The second assignment of error is that the trial 
court erred in overruling the demurrer to the second 
cause of action in the complaint. The foregoing argu-
ment may als.o be set up here in refutation of appellants' 
contention and in support of respondents' position 
that there was no error and though there was, it was 
not prejudicial. The position of respondent Geneve 
Graehl Burt was akin to the position of the supposed 
wife in the case of Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. (2nd) 
262, 107 U ta.h 239. There the parties had assumed the 
relation of man and wife knowing that one of the essen-
tials of a valid marriage was not complied with-that 
the interlocutory decree of divorce of the "'rife had not 
become final. Recognizing that an ineq~itable situation 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
would result, that one p~a.rty to this arrangement would 
be denied a share in the fruit·s of the joint labors, and 
that the other party would be unjustly enriched, this 
court held that the trial court ''in the exercise of its 
equitable power had jurisdiction to require an equitable 
distribution of the proP,ertyi 1acquired during the time 
the litigants were cohabiting as. man and wife.'' Cas,es 
cited in support of that principle were: Sanguinetti v. 
Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P. 2d 8t45, 111 A.L.R. 342, 
·F'igoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal., 29'5 P. 339; Fuller v. F'uller, 
33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241; Werner v. Werner 59 Kan. 39H, 
53 P. 127, 41 L.R.A. 349, 68 Am. S,t. Rep. 372; Krauter 
v. Krauter, 79 Ok, 30, 190 P'. 1088; Deed v. Strode, 6 
Idaho 317, 55 P. 656, 43 L.R.A. 207, 9'6 Am. St. Rep. 
:2G3; Bu?kley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079, 126 
.... \.m. St. Rep'. 900; Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 
200 P. 1080. 
Under similar facts there being a cause of action 
E,tated in the Jenkins case, it follows that there was a 
cause of action stated in favor of Geneve Graehl Burt, 
consequently there was no error in overruling the de-
murrer to the second cause of action. 
Respondents do not dispute the statement of appel-
.tants in their brief, page 30, that as a general rule title 
to the property of a decedent vests. in his heirs. It is 
urgently contended ho-vYever, that in a case like that 
at bar such title is .subject to the equitable claim of one 
lvho frugally and industriously toiled to raise and pro-
vide for decedent's. children and to preserve, ~n1prove 
and enhance decedent's estate. 
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As to assignment of error No. 3, that judgment 
~hould not have been rendered where a cause of action 
was not stated, respondents. contend that their first 
c'-luse of action allege~s. and the evidence proves facts 
which justify judgment for Geneve Graehl Burt; that 
having real property in he-r own name, and without re-
ceiving any money or other thing of value therefor 
( s.tipula.ted and included in the pre-trial s,tatement), not 
exercising a will or intention of her own to pass title 
in her lifetime, she signed the deed and surrendered it 
to said John A. Burt. When asked whether or not she 
intended, during her lifetime, to part with title to that 
property, her answer was "Absolutely no." (tr. 107). 
To that answer there was no contradiction except the 
mute inference arising from the finding of the deed 
1n decedent's safety deposit box. 
In assignment of error No. 4 appellants rely upon 
an alleged variance between pleading and proof in 
plaintiff's first cans.e of action. Whether there is a 
variance depends not upon what the complaint contained 
alone but up~n what was tra,ns.acted at the pre-trial con-
ference, the contents of the pretrial statement and the 
amendments to the complaint permitted by the trial 
court. Appellants s.eem to ignore all of these and point 
to the fact with seeming significance that no evidence 
was introduced to prove their interpretation of plain-
tiffs' complaint. Ordinarily in a case where, as here, 
plaintiffs are handicapped by the proliihitions of the 
''dead man's. statute,'' and this case was no exception, 
all the available evidence is not introduced. That the 
record is not more replete with details of transactions 
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between Geneve Graehl Burt and John A. Burt is 
chargeable to appellants and to their insistence that 
her lips be sealed and the facts suppres·sed surrounding 
the signing and surrender of the deed to her home. 
Assignment of error No .. 5 charges a material vari-
ance between the pleadings and the proof in plaintiffs' 
second cause of action. Appellants take the view that 
~eneve Graehl Burt, regardles.s of other f,acts., could 
never properly lay claim to any interest in the estate 
of John A. Burt because the marriage ceremony by 
which they justified their relation did not meet the re-
quirements of and conform to the Utah statutes 'relating 
to marriage. Numerous adjudicated cases as cited above 
in the argument relating to the second assignment of 
error refute that view. s.ome have permitted a recov-
ery by one of the contracting parties. seemingly to p~re­
vent alone an unjust enrichment and to save the party 
the product of his labor in building up· and accumulating 
said estate. 
In the Jenkins v. Jenkins case, supra, it can hardly 
be .said that the parties. were innocently unaware of the 
requirement which operated to prevent their marriage 
from being valid and binding in the eyes. of the law. 
They knew that the wife's decree of divorce had not 
become final. Yet that fa.ct dld not shackle equity and 
prevent it from coming to the aid of that plaintiff and 
decree to her a proper distribution of the pTop·erty 
accumulated by their joint efforts. 
As to her marriage to John A. Burt, p1aintiff, Gen-
eve Gra,ehl Burt, testified as follows: 
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0. You stated in your sworn complaint, you 
thought you had, had been legally married; you 
remember that you stated that, don't you~ 
A. I said, as far as our religious convic-
tions go, of course, I am his wife; always will 
be his wife unless I prove myself unworthy. 
( tr. 120). 
A. - - - we were firm in our convictions and 
conscience is. what guided us. ( tr. 122). 
She had participated in a ceremony of marriage, 
performed by Israel Barlow ( tr. 100). They lived to-
gether as husband and wife, in perfect confidence and 
with compatibility until the death of Mr. Burt. (tr. 
109). To her mind the marriage was valid and legal, 
made her the wife of John A. Burt and that she would 
always be his wife unless she proved herself unworthy. 
The allegation complained of in paragraph 10 of the 
complaint is that plaintiff entered into what in good 
faith "she thought'' was a valid and legal marriage. 
It clearly referred to the state of mind of plaintiff 
Geneve Grahel Burt with respect to said marriage and 
the proof clearly revealed her belief and confidence in 
it so that appellants were not deceived nor misled to 
their prejudice. It is submitted, therefore, that there 
was no variance or if any at all it was so slight and 
immaterial as t9 be no cause for reversal whatever. 
"It is a general rule under the codes. that no 
variance between the allegation in a pleading and 
the proof is deemed material unless it has ac-
tually misled the adverse party to his prejudice 
in maintaining his. action or defense upon the 
merits.'' Bancroft Code Pleading Vol. 1, sec. 
702; Dobbs v. Rees, 49 Utah 270, 163, Pa.c. 255. 
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There was no objection by defendants a.t the trial 
that they had been prejudiced by a variance. And as. 
has been said by the ldaho Supreme Court that if dur-
ing the trial of a cause the defendant is misled to his 
prejudice because of a variance between the allegations 
of the complaint and the proofs he should then and there 
notify the court of that fact and ask for proper relief; 
if he does not, he will not be permitted to raise the 
question on motion for new trial or an a.p,peal. Auilbach 
v. Dahler 4 Idaho 654. 43 P:ac. 322. 
In assignment of error No. 6 app~ellants complain 
of the conclusion of the court as. to the first cause of 
action that plaintiff should be allowed the p:roperty in 
question. The court did find that the property had been 
selected as a home for plaintiff and her children, that 
the deed to said property showed Geneve Graehl as 
g-rantee and that the deed to said p~roperty had not, 
in law, been delivered by plaintiff to John_ A Burt and 
that when she signed it she did not intend to part with 
title to said property. The court thereupon concluded 
that the deed from said plaintiff to John A. Burt should 
be determined to he void and should be cancelled, and 
that plaintiff should be allowed the said property. It 
is submitted that the second is in effect a restatement 
of the first, that to cancel the deed recorded by de-
fendants is to allow 1o plaintiff the p~rop·erty which had 
originally stood in her name. 
In assignment of error No. 7 appellants complain 
of the last paragraph of the deeree which p~rovided that: 
"It is the further judgment of this court 
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that should plaintiff by appeal or review of this 
judgment be deprived of the ownership of the 
property described in the foregoing paragraph 
hereof, then and in that event, said plaintiff 
should be granted and allowed an equitable in- · 
terest in the estate of deceased, John A. Burt, 
the amount of such interest to be determined by 
further proceedings in this court.'' 
This. was an equitable proceeding and it is inher-
ently the power of a court of equity to so frame its 
decree that in finally disposing of all rna tters justice 
might be had between the parties. 
In Ma.son v. E,llison, 160 P. 2nd 326, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona in making a conditional decree said, 
quoting from 19· Am. Jur. 23, sec. 123: 
"In an equity case the court-adapts its 
relief and molds its deerees to satisfy the require-
ments of the case and to conserve the equities of 
the parties litigant. The court has such power 
since its purpose is the accomplishment of justice 
amid all the vicissitudes and intricacies of life.'' 
In Baumer v. Welsh, (Kan~) 226 P. 98, the follow-
ing appears relative to the power of a court of equity: 
''In a suit in equity to establish an interest 
in specific real property and for appropriate 
relief, the court, having acquired jurisdiction of 
the parties .and of the subject matter and having 
found that plaintiff has a specific interest in the 
property, has power to so frame its decrees. as 
to meet the exigencies of the situation and to 
reach the ends of justice.'' 
And in a California case the court, going beyond 
the injunction sought, said: 
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"It is a cardinal rule of equity that the 
court has power to make its decrees ef:fe,ctive 
and that when it has jurisdiction of the parties 
and of the subject matter its decree will be com-
plete in order to terminate the litigation if pos-
sible." Santa Monica Ice Cold Storage Co. v. 
Rossier et al. 109 P. 2nd 382. 
Complaint is made by a.pp·ellants by assignments of 
error 8 and 9 that the court imp,roperly made valid 
delivery of the deed to John A. Burt and intent to vest 
title in said John A. Burt issues for the trial of said 
case. They were informed at the beginning of the pre-
trial conference that plaintiffs intended to amend the 
complaint for that p~urpose. There was no objection 
made to that proposal and before leaving said confer--
ence the court indicated that said issues would be re-
garded as in dispute and .s.o to be· diBposed of at the 
trial of said ease. 
In the adoption of the rule providing for the pre-
trial procedure effective May 1, 1948, this court made 
simplification of the issues one of the purpos,es of the 
pre-trial process and further provided that: 
''The court shall make an order-which limits. 
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by 
admissions or agreements of couns.el; and such 
order when entered controls the subsequent 
course of the action unless modified at the trial 
to prevent manifest injustic~s. ,., 
Pursuant to that rule the court called a pre-trial 
conference on December 3, 1948, at which counsel for 
the parties were present. Couns,el for plaintiffs asked 
to be allowed to make amendments so that valid de-
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livery of the deed in question would clearly be in issue 
at the trial as well as the purpose of the deed. The trial 
~udge made an outline of the matters admitted and the 
matters in dispute and by re~ading his outline indicated 
what his pre-trial order would be. At the beginning of 
the trial the court said, ''We all agree that is a disputed 
issue, and we are going to hear evidence about it." 
(tr. 49). 
Testimony on the purpose of the deed to John 
A. Burt wa.s introduced and objected to by counsel for 
defendants only ''on the ground it is attempting to vary 
the terms of a written instrument." ( tr. 106). 
In assignment of error No. 10 this same objection 
that oral testimony was being introduced to vary the 
terms of a written instrument is urged. By examination 
of plaintiff it was sought· to demonstrate her intent when 
she signed the deed in dispute. There: was no attempt 
made .to change its terms.. The object was to estab-
lish its effect. Counsel contends that the court erred in 
permitting plaintiff to testify respecting· her intention 
not to transfer title to deceased. His objection was that 
to permit her to testify would, by parol, vary the terms 
of a written instrument. It is submitted that the pur-
pose of the testimony was not to change· the terms of 
the deed but to clarify and illuminate the circumstances 
under which the deed was executed and the purpose· of 
its execution. It may be contended with propriety that 
a deed properly executed in the possession of the grantee 
carries with it a presumption of delivery. Said pre-
sumption, however, by pToper evidence is rebuttable, the 
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intention of grantor being of outstanding importance 
in that respect. ''The intention of the parties, particu-
larly the grantor, is an essential and controlling element 
of delivery of a. deed.'' 16 Am. J ur. 501 sec. 115. 
''The presumption of delivery arising from 
manual tradition, however, is· not conclusive and 
may be rebutted by the evidence, the burden of 
proving a valid delivery ordinarily resting upon 
the party relying upon the instrument.'' Tighe 
v. Davis (Mich.) 278t N.W. 60. See also Hood v. 
Nichol (Ky.) 34 S.W. (2nd) 429; Blades v. Wilm-
ington Trust Co. (N.C.) 178 S.E. 565, John Han-
cock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Chinn (Kan.) 28 
Pac. 2nd 761; Cavett v. Pettigrew (Ark.) 3-2 S.W. 
2nd 308; Rouland v. Burton (TIL) 15 N.E. (2nd) 
920; Buchwald v. Buchwald (Md.) 199 A .. 800, 
141 A.L.R. 308. 
This court has recently had a similar question be-
fore it and had this to say with resp·ect to the importance 
and materiality of the donor's intention in case of a 
bill of sale. 
' 'Before such instrument (bill of sale) can 
have the effect of transferring any interest in 
the property there must be a delivery with the 
necessary intention. What the donor's intention 
was may be shown by parol evidence without vio-
lating the rule against varying the terms of a 
written instrument by such evidence, because the 
object is not to change the terms of the instru-
ment but to show whether the instrument ever 
went into effect as a transfer of the prope~rty or 
an interest therein. '' Jackson v. Jackson (Utah) 
192 P. (2nd) 397. 
Respondents submit in light of the foregoing au-
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thority there was no error 1n overruling defendants' 
objection to the evidence. 
Appellants' assignment of error No. 11 is almost 
too general to merit any attention and is uncertain to 
the point that it is difficult, almost impossible- in fact 
to ascertain to which sta·tement of the court reference 
is made. It is assumed that it is the statemen ( tr. 125-
126) where the court says : 
''I think this evidence is objectionable, but 
I am not going to put the burden on myself to go 
back here and find out what is objectionable and 
what isn't. It has come in-certain statements, 
without any objection, and a general motion of 
that nature, I wouldn't know which you want 
stricken and which you wanted to have the mo-
tion apply to, and I think, however, that the 
court will disregard the evidence that is incom-
petent, insofar as I am able to; is that's satis-
factory, Mr. Young.'' 
Itis not evident wherein the court ignored an agree-
ment as to the evidence in making its findings. We think 
counsel does not seriously contend that prejudicial eiTOr 
can be found in this. assignment. 
A·ssignment of error No. 12 .and 13 assail the court 
for failure to make findings and conclusion and judg-
ment on the question of laches and limitations. Respon-
dents say in answer that such defenses, if ever intended 
to be, were not made and did not become issues at the 
trial. Counsel made no meption of them in discussing 
the proposed issues at the pre-trial conference; he made 
no objection to their omission from the prepared Pre-
Trial Statement; he introduced no evidence concerning 
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either alledged defense during the course of the trial 
and made no argument concerning them at the close 
of the trial. Respondents contend that these alleged 
defenses, with numerous other matters such as the alle-
gation in the middle of page 3 of defendants' answer 
that ''The Utah State Tax Commission insists that said 
property be made part and parcel of his estate for tax-
ation purposes,'' were "washed out" in the pre-trial 
process and cannot now be made the ba~sis. for a rever.sal 
of the judgment of the trial court. If that view of the 
effect of the pre-trial process is not correct, then instea.d 
o~ assisting in ''coping with the present over crowding 
of court calendars-. '' as intended by the Committee on 
Rules of Civil Procedure which recommended its adop~­
tion to this court, it would have just the opposite effect 
and be merely another cumbersome process that would 
entail greater delay rather than saving of time and 
would increase uncertainty and confusion at the trial 
rather than prevent it. 
Assignment of error No. 14 complains of the con-
clusions of law and judgment of the First C!ause of 
Action. Ap·pellants' objection seems to be that cancel-
ling of the deed to John A. Burt and allowing of the 
property described therein to respondent, Geneve Gra.ehl 
Burt are inconsistent and at war with each other, as it is 
said in Appellants' Brief, p~. 37, 
''They endeavor to void the deed and at the 
same time allow plaintiff the prop.erty. I fail to 
see how they can do both.'' 
Actually the two p1rovisions are consistent and 
parallel each other. The· earlier deed to such property 
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showed Geneve Gra.ehl as grantee and was duly re-
corded. (Pre-Trial Statement.-tr. 27, 28). Canceling 
the later one signed by her in which John A. Burt was 
named a.s grantee re-established Geneve Graehl as the 
title holder of reeord and ''allowed Geneve Graehl Burt 
the property---.'' 
Ap·pellants deny that Geneve Graehl Burt owned 
the property but insist on the contrary that she received 
it merely as a trustee for John A. Burt, she being, as 
appellants assert, "~So far as the law was concerned-
a stranger to him." They cite Anderson v. Cercone, 180 
P. 586, 54 Utah 345, to supvort that position. That case 
cited with approval 39 Cyc. P1). 118, 119'. 
''It is a well settled rule of equity, in the 
absence of statutory provisions otherwise, that 
where property is paid for with money or assets 
of one person, and the title thereto is taken in 
the name of another person, in the absence of cir-
cumstances showing a different. intention or un~ 
derstanding a resulting trust in the property 
arises in favor of the person whose money or 
assets are so used,--- ,., 
By its own terms this rule appears not to be one 
. of universal application : 
''It is a vvell settled rule of equity - in the 
absence of circumstances showing a different 
intention or understanding- - - . '' 
The transcript is full of evidence showing a differ-
ent intention or understanding on the part of J'ohn A. 
Burt. Mr. Edwin E. Johnson, who stated that he lived 
on the property which adjoins, on the west, the property 
occupied by plaintiff, Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt, and that 
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he was, at the time he te·s,tified; the Bishop of the 
Evergreen Ward, testified that he talked to John A. 
Burt during his lifetime. He said, ''Well, on several oc-
casions I have talked to him along the line of what he 
was going to do with the p1roperty; in fact at one time, 
I tried to buy a strip off the lower end next to me from 
him, and he intimated that he didn't care to sell any of 
it, that he proposed to have a home there for his wife 
and children." ( tr. 57). 
Edward Caps on a man 7 4 years of age who had 
lived in the locality of the Geneve Burt home on E~ver­
green Street all his life, testified that he worked on the 
Burt property improving it Respecting his conversa-
tions with Mr. John A. Burt, he s.aid on direct exam-
ination: 
'' Q. Did he ever state to you in your con-
versations, whether that pla,ce belonged to Gen-
eve~ 
A. Yes, he said that was for, for her and 
the family.'' 
On cross examination he testified as follows.: 
'' Q. Did he ever tell you that that was for 
her during her lifetime~ 
A. Well, he told me on one occasion that 
he gave her the place. 
Q. He had told you on one occasion he had 
given her the place~ _ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he didn't say whether he gave her 
a life interest or the whole fee or what' 
A. Yes; I understood him to say he give 
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her the deeds to it, as near as I can remember." 
(tr. 72). 
C. H. Oa.rlquist, a former business associate of John 
A. Burt, testified respecting a conversation he had with 
appellant, Luella Burt. 
,., Q. Did you have a convertation with Lu-
ella Burt regarding John A. Burt' 
A. Yes, sir. 
0. Will you state about when that was Mr. 
CarlquJst' 
A. It was in the afternoon of the day he 
passed away. 
Q. And will you relate the substance of that 
.conversation so far as it concerns this plaintiff, 
Geneve Burt' (tr. 86). 
A. Luella Burt had been very fair to Mrs. 
Geneve Graehl Burt because he had given her 
that property .out in Millcreek, and it was a very 
valuable p[ece of property - - - . '' ( tr. 88). 
On cross examination Mr. C'arlquist testified: 
'' Q. Didn't she aJ_so .say that that home up 
there was to be for, not only Geneve but for the 
children and that was all they were to get f 
A. No, apparently a.t that time she thought 
that the home was in Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt's 
name, and I praised her broadminded attitude 
when I talked to Mr. Parkinson, so that is how it 
came up. 
Q. That was before the funeral' 
A. Tha.t was before the funeral. 
Q. And the safety box had been opened? 
A. Yes, sir." ( tr. 88). 
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Ralph E. Pitts, a neighbor, testified: 
''Q. Did you have conversations with Mr. 
Burt1 
A. A number of times. 
Q. How did he refer to Geneve Graehl Burt 
1n your conversations~ 
A. Well, just as wife and family. 
Q. Did he at any time make any statement 
to you with respect to the property there as it 
related to these plaintiffs 1 
A. Yes, he talked to me on one or two oc-
casions, and his chief concern seemed to be that 
the home and property there should be as the 
family wanted it. He made· the statement several 
times that that wa.s their home, and they were 
the ones to say how it should be. Now, I make 
that statement because it was a small home and 
they wer~they wanted to enlarge and make 
changes from time to time, and he said that it 
was their home, and, if that was their will, that 
was the way he wanted it." ( tr. 90). 
Plaintiff testified on cross examination respe·cting 
the building of a house on the property in question: 
"Q. But Mr. Burt knew about it before it 
was built didn't he1 
A. Oh, yes, he knew they were building it. 
Q. He knew it so that he gave his permi~ 
sion1 
A. Not until I gave mine though. He con-
sidered it was my pla,ce, considered it was my 
place to do with as I pleased. He never consid-
ered that was his place at all." (tr. 113). 
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Again while under cross examination: 
'' Q. He got that as a home~ for you~ 
A. Yes, he bought it for me when I was 
so sick. 
Q. The property that you are living in, he 
purchased with his. own mone~slpeaking !Of 
''he,'' Mr. Burt~ 
A. Yes, he purchased it in my name for me. 
Q. And you paid nothing~ 
A. No, I didn't pay anything." ( tr. 123). 
Clearly in light of all these circumstances showing 
a different intention on the part of John A. Burt it. 
cannot be said that the rule relied upon by appellants 
to ere ate a resulting trust applies. in this case. 
As to error No. 15 respondents disagree with state-
ment· of a.ppellants respecting the second cause of ac-
tion that ',' Geneve Graeh] Burt, is trying to get a 
part of the inheritance which rightfully, under the law, 
belongs to ·an the children, of the dece~ased and his 
legal wife, Luella H. Burt---.,., (Brief p. 42). Plaintiff 
.sought the aid ·of a court of equity to have set apart 
to her a fair sh~re of the e~state of the approximate 
value of $90,000.00 she had helped to accumulate dur-
ing 28 years of toil and hardship and to nullify the action 
which would pauperize her and put her upon the charity 
of her children in her dee1ining years. The law does not 
make her an heir, but equity will not permit her to be 
robbed. As was said by this court in the case of Jenkins 
v. Jenkins, supra, 
''In view of the fact that the plaintiff had 
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only an interlocutory degree of divorce from her 
prior marriage and said decree had not yet be-
come final, she was still married at the time of 
her purported marriage to defendant - - - . '' 
'' - - - where, as here, both parties knew of 
the interlocutory decree of divorce, which had 
not yet become final, the court in the exercise of 
its equitable power had jurisdiction to require 
an equitable distribution of the property acquired 
during the time the litigants were cohabiting as 
man and wife." 
Other courts have in similar cases done equity be-
tween the parties. even though in the eyes of the law 
there had been no valid marriage to make them hus-
band and wife--no relationship that would ve.st in one 
an enforceabl~ right to claim part of the property owned 
by the other. 
In Fuller v. Fuller (Kan.) 7 P. 241; the court 
denied alimony after an annulment of a s.upposed mar-
riage, but said : 
''It is our opinion, however, that in all ju-
dicial separations of persons who have lived to-
gether as husband and wife, a fair and equitable 
division of their property should be had; - - - . " 
In Werner v. Werner, (Kan) 5H P·. 127, the court 
dissolved an invalid marriage and decreed a distribu-
tion of the property accumulated by the two during the 
time they cohabited. In upholding the decree the Su-
preme Court of that S.tate said: 
''But, independently of the statute of di-
vorce we think the court had authority to decree 
not o~ly an annulment of the marriage, but also 
the division o:f the property which had been 
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jointly accumulated by the parties.--- the testi-
mony tends to show that the property they have 
now is largely the result of their joint labor and 
earnings .. She was active, industrious and faith-
ful-she performed labor of the hardest and 
most menial character-she was diligent, tireless 
and economical in building up a business and in 
gathering up the property which they held at 
the time of the trial. A portion of the time the 
title to the property was in her name -- - . The 
court has the~ same power to make equitable divi-
sion of the property so accumulated as it would 
have in case of the dissolution of a business part-
nership. --- There is considerable testimony 
tending to show--4hat her mis~conception of the 
Jaw was largely due to the advice and influence 
of the plaintiff in error. - ~ - the share which 
was awarded her was no more than she was 
justly entitled to."' 
There are many situations here parallel to those 
recited in the decision in the Werner case quoted from 
above: 
John A. Burt proposed marriage to plaintiff 
---''continued his a~ttentions for quite a little 
while.'' ( tr. 100). 
''Well we had an awful struggle; conditions 
was bad. Mr. Burt was broke when I married 
him; he had absolutely nothing; he was in debt. 
Of course, I went into it understanding all this, 
but this was a matter of religious conviction with 
me and him both, so we put our shoulders to 
the wheel and pushed along. I worked; I did 
some cleaning, I did sewing, not only for my 
children out of cast-offs. 
The court: 
May I say "Then you say "I worked, did some 
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cleaning" you worked outside the home for in-
comet 
A. Yes, I did sewing for friends and rela-
tives, and I did some cleaning out of the home 
for others, and I did laundry work, did washing 
and ironing and I did a little hairdressing. This 
was while the children were young and my health 
was a little better, and, then in addition to that, 
I clothed my children practically on cast-offs .. 
I am a good sewer, and I made them beautiful 
clothing out of cast-offs from my sisters. and my 
relatives---." (tr. 101, 102). 
Respecting John A. Burt, 
''He always discuss-ed his business affairs 
with me, his business enterpris-e-failures anc 
succeses. He confided in me perfectly.'' 
Q. Did he ask your counsel and sugges-
tions~ 
A. Yes, he asked for my counsel and we 
considered things-he s.howed me different pieces 
of property, and we were generally agreeable; 
I had tried to please him.'' ( tr. 110). 
Edwin E. Johnson, bishop of the L. D. S. Ward 
where plaintiff lives, said: 
''And M.rs. Burt has worked very consistent-
ly; in fact, for a woman of her a.ge, I wondered 
at times how she could do the typ~e of work she 
really did. ( tr. 6.2). 
Mrs. Dorothy B. Sandberg, a former neighbor, tes-
tified that she had known plaintiff before s.he moved 
onto Evergreen Street and stated respecting plaintiff: 
''- -- that she was a very diligent worker, 
that she made most of the childrens clothing; 
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that she painted and repaired furniture. (tr. 79). 
---that she was more industrious than the av-
erage mother, and that she had a lot of difficul-
ties to overcome." (tr. 81). 
Ralph E. J:1itts, a neighbor said: 
' 'Well, she certainly took a more than a 
motherly interest let's s.ay; the lights were burn-
ing many times after midnight so that (the chil-
dren) could have the right dress .for school and 
graduation dresses-she did a lot of sewing-
she worked almost constantly; then they would 
be done and gone for days at a time, and of 
course we would go over and she would be sick 
at that time. She would make the statement she 
just had to go out and work because the weeds 
we-re getting the best of her, s.o . she worked quite 
constantly.'' ( tr. 48). 
Mrs. Pitts testified that Mrs. Burt: 
,., - - - has. been a very hard worker and has 
done a whole lot of canning foods and making 
clothes for the children; worked around the place. 
They have papered roomsr--she and the girls done 
painting and remodeling. She works outside, too, 
except when she is sick.'' ( tr. 95). 
Edward Capson, her neighbor, said that the home 
of· plaintiff on Evergreen Street was in very poor shape 
when they moved onto it. 
''---it had been s~ge brush-it was waste 
ground-there was nothing growed there, it just 
was rocky. ---we carried rocks off of there; I 
wheeled them off, and his children and wife 
picked them off in buckets - when he wasn't 
there, she was the one to tell me what to do. ( tr. 
70).--- she was always working outside. (tr. 73.) 
- -- - his wife was always working. -- - she done 
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all her own housework I guess. - - - she added to 
the house. ( tr. 7 4). I suppose Mrs. Burt put in 
more hours than anyone-she was always there 
-she done pretty near everything, watering-
with the weeds---." (tr. 75). 
Respondents believe that in light of the record 
equity could do no less than void the deed to John A. 
Burt and allow to Geneve Graehl Burt her home and, 
on condition that those provisions should fail, set ap~art 
to her a portion of the estate she helped create. They, 
accordingly, submit their case and pray that this hon-
orable court will affirm the decision of the trial court. 
MERRILL C. FAUX, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Resp,ondents 
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